Abstract: Suppose n nodes with n 0 acquaintances per node are randomly deployed in a two-dimensional Euclidean space with the geographic restriction that each pair of nodes can exchange information between them directly only if the distance between them is at most r, the acquaintanceship between nodes form a random graph, while the physical communication links constitute a random geometric graph. To get a fully connected and secure graph, we introduce a secrecy transfer algorithm which combines the random graph and the random geometric graph via an introduction process to produce an acquaintanceship graph G n,n0 . We find that the maximum component of graph G n,n0 transitions rapidly from small components to a giant component when n 0 is larger than a threshold, the threshold is derived, and applications for sensor networks are presented.
I.

INTRODUCTION
Suppose at a classroom with n students, each of whom initially has n 0 acquaintances who are randomly chosen among them. Now mention to one of them a message, but ask that student to share this message only with his or her acquaintances. Assume students are not allowed to leave their sites, and can talk only with adjacent students. At first, students are isolated from each other.
If two adjacent students are acquainted with each other, a link forms between them. As a consequence, subtle paths start connecting students who are still strangers to each other. For example, though John has not met Mary yet, they have both met Mike, and so there is a path from John to Mary through Mike. If John and Mary are neighbors, chances are that now they become new acquaintances through the introduction of Mike, and a link forms between them. As time goes on, some small acquaintance groups emerge. By following the links in the group, one can now find a path between any two students in the same group. Further, two stranger students, say Alice and Bob, belonging to different groups may be adjacent, but if there are any two students in the two groups respectively familiar with each other, Alice and Bob may use them as introducers to get common acquaintance and establish a link between them. Then, two groups melt to form a larger group. By repeating this process, the students will be increasingly interwoven by such links, creating a web of acquaintances. We denote this construction as secrecy transfer and the resulting network as an acquaintanceship graph. We are here interested in the question: for which value of n 0 is there likely to be a connected acquaintanceship graph that includes all the students after the secrecy transfer process?
The acquaintanceship graph, denoted as G n,n0 , combines random graph [1] and random geometric graph [2] . A random geometric graph G n,r is a graph resulting from placing n nodes randomly in a plane and connecting each pair of nodes iff their Euclidean distance is at most the radius r, whereas a random graph G n,p is a graph with n nodes in which each edge (out of the possible edges) is chosen independently at random with a probability p. Random graphs and random geometric graphs have been studied extensively, but in a separate way. Random graph and its variations have been used as models of social structure in, for example, epidemiology [3] , while random geometric graph is always viewed as a wireless communication network [4] [5], such as Ad hoc, Mesh, or sensor network. In fact, random graphs and random geometric graphs have different structural properties. Any two nodes in a random graph can be connected by a link with certain probability regardless of their geographical position. Random key graphs have recently Zhihong Liu, Jianfeng Ma, and Yong Zeng, Secrecy Transfer For Sensor Networks: From Random Graphs to Secure Random Geometric Graphs been used by Di Pietro et al. [6] to model the random key predistribution scheme of Eschenauer and Gligor [7] . The random key graph is a random graph obtained as follows. n nodes, each assigned a subset of keys, are distributed uniformly at random on the given field. An edge is added if two nodes are within a radius r and share at least one common key. Formally, the resulting graph, matching a random graph with identical link probability to a random geometric graph, can be considered as the initial graph of the acquaintanceship graph G n,n0 . Note that, unlike random key graphs, secrecy transfer is a growth model, and can be considered as a stochastic process.
We are interested in the crucial property, connectivity, of the resulting acquaintanceship graph.
Intuitively, we think that there is a threshold value. If n 0 is larger than that value and the underlying graph G n,r is connected physically, the graph G n,n0 may be connected. In [8] , we use secrecy transfer to enhance the security performance of key infection [9] , but do not explore its properties. In this paper, some results are given and complemented by simulations.
II. SECRECY TRANSFER
Let n nodes distributed uniformly in a field, each of them has n 0 acquaintances. Assuming nodes A and B are adjacent. At first, A and B are connected if they are acquainted with each other (Fig.   1a ). If A and B are connected by a path, then an edge A-B is added (Fig. 1b) . As time goes on, the graph G n,n0 evolves continuously and gradually consists of components. If node A belongs to component , and B has acquaint with at least one of nodes in , say node C in , we connect A and B by a new edge (Fig. 1c ). For the case where A and B belong to different components and , if there exist two familiar nodes C and D in and respectively, we introduce an edge between A and B (Fig. 1d) ; Otherwise, A and B are disconnected at present stage. Continuing this process, n nodes are turned into a graph G n,n0 . 2. An example of the secrecy transfer, with n=500 nodes randomly distributed over a 500× 500m 2 field, n 0 =20, and r=35m.
As depicted in Fig. 2 , 500 nodes are randomly distributed over a field, , and the radius . At first, two adjacent nodes connect with probability , and we get the initial graph , as illustrated in Fig. 2a . After repeating secrecy transfer, it gradually turns to be the graph in Fig. 1f , which approximates to random geometric graph .
One of our goals is to design a security mechanism to enable any two adjacent nodes to establish a pairwise key after they are deployed. Suppose every node in the network has been loaded before its deployment with n 0 secret keys, each of which is shared with one of its acquaintances. , as plotted in Fig. 3 . 
III. CONNECTIVITY THRESHOLD
The component structure of changes gradually as the secrecy transfer is applied. As illustrated in Fig. 2 , at first, the greatest component of is tree or cycle of small order.
Gradually, a giant component emerges, swallowing the whole network. Thus, the expectation of random variable is .
For are mutually independent, the expectation of is For a component of order , the cycle of acquaintances of this component may consist of nodes on average. Let , the probability that there is at least one common acquaintance between component and is For example, for , , and , the probability tends to 1 when . This provides intuition that, a component of order 200 is attractive and will swallow nodes nearby to form a larger component, a kind of rich get richer phenomenon. For two component of order , the probability approximates 1 if . In general, the larger the components, the more likely they are to be mixed together. Popularity is attractive.
In a random graph with n vertices and edges, if with , the greatest component has (with probability tending to 1 for ) approximately vertices. As a special case, when , , such large component in will swallow the whole network whp. if the network is connected physically.
To determine the value n 0 which will guarantee the connectivity of , we employ the well-known algorithm [10] to generate random graphs with n nodes and n 0 links per node where , then deploy the nodes into a square region to obtain a random topology. For , , and varying, we repeat our simulations 100 times to yield an acceptable confidence of results. For each simulation, we measure empirical values for the maximum component and the second component for each trial, averaged over 50 random topologies. In Within this context, the question is, under what conditions is the graph be connected?
More specifically, how can we choose n 0 such that with high probability, the graph constructed by secrecy transfer will be connected.
Consider an arbitrary pair of adjacent nodes A and B in graph which have not established secret key between them. If is connected, there is at least one path in graph , say Thus, to get a fully connected graph , two conditions must be satisfied. First, the graph must be connected, which means that, given the value n and a deployment region, the value r should be large enough to guarantee a connected graph . Assume n nodes are uniformly deployed in a unit square , the well-known connectivity threshold [5] . In this paper, we set the radius r to be above this critical value to ensure the random geometric graph be fully connected. Second, the value n 0 must be large enough to get the random graph fully connected. For a random graph , when p is zero, the graph does not have any edge, whereas when p is one, the graph is fully connected. Erdös and Rényi [1] showed that, for monotone properties, there exists a value of p such that the property moves from nonexistent to certainly true in a very large random graph. The function defining p is called the threshold function of a property. Given a desired probability for graph connectivity, the threshold function p is defined by where and c is any real constant.
Therefore, given n we can find p for which the resulting graph is connected with desired probability . Thus, the connectivity threshold of is IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS Consider a graph of n nodes with n 0 acquaintances per node randomly selected among the nodes in the graph, we are also interested in the time needed for secrecy transfer to reach a stable state. The speed of the convergence of secrecy transfer depends on the values of n 0 , r for given n.
To gain insight, we first consider the value r and perform a simulation-based study of it.
Employing a uniform random generator, we position nodes in a square planar region of , following our deployment from Section 3. For each random topology, we estimate the speed of the convergence of secrecy transfer as the number of rounds that it needs to perform to reach a stable state. At each round, each pair of adjacent nodes in the graph employ secrecy transfer to try to get connected. If there is no new edge is added in this round, secrecy transfer terminates. We observe from Fig. 5 that, as the value r increases, the stable state is reached with a speed that is faster, and for value , the number of rounds reaches its peak when approximates to its connectivity threshold.
Conventionally, a wireless network consists of some nodes as supernodes, those using a communication radius greater than used by normal nodes. The use of these supernodes lead to important characteristics of complex networks [11] : a small average shortest path length between all nodes, and a high cluster coefficient, which help us saving network resources, avoiding excessive communication, and reducing the time to data delivery. From the simulation results illustrated in Fig. 7 , we conclude that, compared to the homogeneous network case, for a heterogeneous network with supernodes, as the radius of supernodes grows, the value of n 0 required to maintain connectivity of graph decreases, the speed of the convergence of secrecy transfer accelerates. Hierarchically, the supernodes can form a higher layer, while the normal nodes constitute a lower layer of the network. An implication of a heterogeneous network is that it has better performance with regard to improving energy, power and topology control, scalability, and fault-tolerance and routing efficiency. is uniformly random over m values, the probability that a bit is 0 after all the n elements are hashed and their bits marked is . Therefore, the probability for a false positive is . The right hand side is minimized when in which case it becomes . 
Initialization phase:
We first generate a random graph with n nodes and links per node. For each link a secret key is assigned to it. Each node stores the ID of its neighbors and the corresponding secret key between them. For instance, if node i has neighbors , it constructs an acquaintanceship set where is the assigned secret key between node i and its neighbor . After that nodes are deployed randomly over a field.
Secrecy transfer phase:
Suppose neighbor. Therefore, they need to store the new and will broadcast it later.
Next, we give an overview of the operations of secrecy transfer. In general, the operation of 
Security analysis
As discussed in Section II, secrecy transfer is robust against eavesdrop attack, for each edge is added via the existing trustiness between nodes. In this subsection, we study the resilience of secrecy transfer against the node compromise attack. Let denote the number of nodes that have been captured. Suppose the compromised nodes are independently and random distributed among the entire deployment region.
Theoretically, as depicted in 
V. APPLICATIONS OF SECRECY TRANSFER
Sensor networks have been envisioned to consist of groups of lightweight sensor nodes that may be randomly and densely deployed to observe data within a physical region of interest. The nodes form an ad hoc multihop network, communicating readings to base stations. The connectivity of these self-organizing networks is critical for reliable sensing and inference capabilities [12] .
Conventionally, sensor network is modeled as a random geometric graph , two nodes A and B establish a bidirectional link if they are within a radius r. To protect the sensitive data in hostile environments, secret keys should be established to achieve data confidentially, integrity and authentication between communicating parties [13] . The first practical key predistribution scheme for sensor network is random key predistribution scheme introduced by Eschenauer and
Gligor [7] . For a pool size keys, 250 keys need to be stored in a node's memory to have the probability that they share a key in their key sets to be . A major advantage of this scheme is the exclusion of the base station in key management. Disadvantages of it are that it is not suitable for sparse deployed networks where the number of adjacent nodes of any node is small, and the storage overhead is still high for lightweight nodes (many keys in node's key set are not used finally). As mentioned previously, secrecy transfer can turn a random graph to a secure random geometric graph. If the secrecy transfer is applied with random key predistribution scheme, the storage overhead of nodes is lower.
In [14] , an asymmetric key predistribution scheme AKPS for sensor network is proposed. In AKPS, each node only stores two secret values initially, a large amount of storage is shifted to keying material servers (KMS). If AKPS needs to provide public keying material for any pair of nodes, a KMS should store public keying material for a network of n nodes. Roughly speaking, AKPS is not viable for arbitrary large network. We find that, if secrecy transfer is used, a KMS does not need to be preloaded with public keying material. Specially, suppose out of public keying material are randomly picked, the initial probability that two arbitrary sensors can establish a secret key is , which means that, any nodes has acquaintances on average. As before, if is larger than the connectivity threshold in graph , we can repeat the construction process of secrecy transfer to get a connected graph which will guarantee that any pair of adjacent nodes can establish secret keys.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This work presented a secrecy transfer algorithm which is directly based on the idea that networks form primarily by people introducing pairs of their acquaintances to one another. The resulting network, showing both properties of random graph and random geometric graph, may not only model the introduction process in social networks, but also be used to protect the network. In fact, secrecy transfer, a localized algorithm which does require global knowledge of the network, can achieve the desired global behavior.
If an adversary is not present at the network before secrecy transfer has completed, or it takes more time than a secure interval to compromise nodes, the communication links established by secrecy transfer are secure; otherwise, undetected malicious nodes may degrade the security of secrecy transfer and jeopardize the network. How to build a distribution model for the spread of the malicious behavior of compromised nodes and design efficient countermeasures against such active attack are parts of our future researches.
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